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Purpose. This conceptual paper takes the firms’ perspective about practical implications of the theory of the global commons. Global commons 
are the areas and resources defined as those being beyond national jurisdictions. Their governance, today, however, is still coordinated 
largely by national states.  
Design/Method/Approach. This paper introduces a firm's perspective based on the global commons approach.  
Findings. At present, companies deal with national governments concerning their emissions and, perhaps, the international emissions trading 
scheme. Theory argues about the need to shift the responsibility from the national to global governmental levels, i. e. the United Nations.  
Theoretical implications. Given the input orientation put forward by this approach, companies – except fossil fuel extractors – would not actually 
have to deal with any governmental or regulatory bodies but can focus their capabilities on what they are best at: serving the needs of their 
customers. Fossil fuel extracting companies, in order to sell these fossil fuels, will have to purchase the amount of emission rights before 
they sell the fuel into the economic cycle. This approach establishes an economic incentive for companies to employ technologies with low 
or zero fossil fuel consumption while making the transition path predictable. The underlying concept, therefore, can also be referred to as 
an immissions scheme (from Latin immissio, “to let in”).  
Originality/Value. Governing a global common through national structures is inappropriate and does not reflect the nature of the underlying 
resource. This paper proposes a solution to the problem of global climate change. 
Further research. Further research is needed to address the effect of 
this strategy on different industries, and how those are affected 
based on the degree to which they employ fossil fuels.  
 
Paper type – сonceptual. 
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Мета дослідження – оглянути точку зору фірм, що пропонують 
викопне паливо, на теорію загального надбання людства 
(theory of global commons). Спільне надбання людства 
охоплює сфери і ресурси, що виходять за рамки 
національних юрисдикцій. Тим не менш, на даний момент їх 
управління здійснюється національними державами.  
Дизайн/Метод/Підхід. В данній статті запропоновано підхід до 
загального надбання людства з точки зору фірм.  
Результат: На сьогоднішній день компанії взаємодіють з 
національними державами щодо емісії вуглекислого газу і, 
ймовірно, міжнародних схем торгівлі квотами на емісію. 
Розглянута теорія пропонує перенести відповідальність 
національного рівня на міжнародний рівень управління, 
тобто на Організацію Об'єднаних Націй. 
Теоретичне значення дослідження: При зміщенні механізму 
контролю в бік палива, що надходить в економіку, більшість 
компаній (крім видобувних компаній) зможуть 
сконцентруватися на тому, на чому вони і повинні 
концентруватися – на задоволенні потреб своїх клієнтів. 
Компанії ж, що видобувають викопне паливо, будуть 
зобов'язані купувати права на емісію палива до того, як це 
паливо потрапить в економічний цикл. Даний підхід 
створить економічний стимул для компаній застосовувати 
технології з низьким або нульовим рівнем споживання 
викопного палива і дозволить зробити перехід від 
викопного палива легко планованим. Таким чином, 
запропонований механізм може називатися іммісійною 
схемою (від латинського immissio, "впускати"). 
Оригінальність/Цінність: Управління спільним надбанням 
людства на рівні національних держав є мало прийнятним, а 
також не відображає природу використовуваних ресурсів. 
Дана стаття пропонує одне з рішень проблеми глобальної 
зміни клімату. 
Перспективи подальших досліджень. Буде потрібно 
дослідження застосованості даної схеми до різних видів 
промисловості, а також у прив'язці до різних типів 
викопного палива. 
 
Тип статті – теоретична. 
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Цель исследования – рассмотреть точку зрения фирм, 
предлагающих ископаемое топливо, на теорию общего 
достояния человечества (theory of global commons). Общее 
достояние человечества охватывает сферы и ресурсы, 
выходящие за рамки национальных юрисдикций. Тем не 
менее, их управление осуществляется на данный момент 
национальными государствами.  
Дизайн/Метод/Подход. В данной статье предложен подход к 
общему достоянию человечества с точки зрения фирм.  
Результат: На сегодняшний день компании взаимодействуют с 
национальными государствами касательно их эмиссии и, 
вероятно, международных схем торговли квотами на 
эмиссию. Развиваемая теория предлагает перенести 
ответственность национального уровня на международный 
уровень управления, то есть на Организацию 
Объединенных Наций.  
Теоретическое значение исследования: При смещении 
механизма контроля в сторону топлива, поступающего в 
экономику, большинство компаний (кроме добывающих 
компаний) смогут сконцентрироваться на том, на чем они и 
должны концентрироваться – на удовлетворении 
потребностей своих клиентов. Компании же, добывающие 
ископаемое топливо, будут обязаны приобретать права на 
эмиссию топлива до того, как это топливо попадет в 
экономический цикл. Данный подход создаст 
экономический стимул для компаний применять 
технологии с низким или нулевым уровнем потребления 
ископаемого топлива и позволит сделать переход от 
ископаемого топлива легко планируемым. Таким образом, 
предлагаемый механизм может называться иммисионной 
схемой (от латинского immissio, “впускать”).  
Оригинальность/Ценность. Управление общим достоянием 
человечества на уровне национальных государств является 
мало применимым, а также не отображает природу 
используемых ресурсов. В данной статье предложено одно 
из решений проблемы глобального изменения климата. 
Перспективы дальнейших исследований. Потребуется 
исследование применимости данной схемы к различным 
видам промышленности, а также в привязке к различным 
типам ископаемого топлива.  
 
Тип статьи – теоретическая. 
 
Ключевые слова: предпринимательство; изменение климата; 
корпоративное управление; устойчивое управление; 
глобальная экономическая политика. 
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Introduction: Why Climate Change 
Prevention is still not globally enforced? 
ith the emissions trading schemes currently installed, a firm’s 
management is confronted with a multitude of players and 
high levels of complexity when trying to comply with existing 
emission standards.  
This paper introduces a trading scheme based on the theory of the 
global commons that considerably reduces this complexity. After a 
full implementation, companies will not even have to purchase 
emission rights anymore, as all emissions will be covered by an 
immissions scheme addressing the point where the fossil fuel 
enters the economic cycle rather than trying to monitor emission 
leaving the economic cycle. The current discussion on climate 
change prevention, also in light of the results of the UN Climate 
Summit 2015 in Paris, still circles around “cap and trade” 
approaches. It is challenging to have many nations agree on 
maximum emission levels. Trickling down further to national levels, 
Quaschning (2016) shows that in order to reach the ambitious goals 
put forth and ratified by 170 states in New York in April 2016, 
considerable changes in production technologies and corporate 
product and production policies are required. Taking into account 
product cycles for cars and heating systems, for instance, 
producers would have to make immediate changes in their 
production lines foreseeing that governments would have to 
prohibit the production and registration of combustion engine 
driven cars by 2025. For heating systems, typically having product 
life cycles of 20-30 years, fossil fuel based systems would have to 
go out of production by 2020. Given the complex contexts and 
multiple logics companies in this sector are embedded in, it seems 
unlikely to reach an easy settlement (Helms et al., 2012) and it 
appears that not only production companies but also more 
knowledge-based firms will find it difficult to comply to such rather 
rigid rules (Anand et al., 2007)2. 
The current approach to emissions reduction can also be 
questioned looking at prices at which emission rights are traded. 
They are only a fraction of what they would be if maximum 
emission levels were actually enforced. Using this as a base, 
however, the paper suggests a scheme that is easier to enforce, 
because it reduces the currently countless emission channels to a 
relatively small number of relevant immission routes3. The 
economic policy effectively reducing global emissions (by 
controlling immission into the global industrial complex) can be 
called “cap, auction, and dividend”. The structure of the remainder 
of the paper is as follows. In the next section the problem is 
described. The subsequent section represents the core part of this 
paper, where the economic policy is developed and explained as 
well as the principles elaborated on which it resides. The conclusive 
section discusses implications, practical questions as well as 
avenues for further research. 
Research Question 
hat does the introduction of the proposed cap, auction and 
dividend mean for companies? 
                                           
2 At first glance, such organizations seem to be less affected than the 
production industries. However, take the example of consulting firms, 
embedded in such complex environments, how will they be affected by rules 
prohibiting or substantially increasing the costs of extensive travelling? 
3 While emissions are measured by the property of the chemical substances 
they produce when being emitted into the atmosphere, immissions are 
addressing the substances that are introduced into the economic cycle at the 
beginning of the value chain. I. e. only the first company in the value chain 
has to purchase emission rights in order to be allowed to introduce a 
substance like a fossil fuel into the value chain, and the costs for that are 
Results 
lobal commons are areas and resources defined as being 
beyond national jurisdiction (Vogler, 2012). The scientific and 
public debate is centering around and in its current form 
incepted by Hardin’s (1968; 1998) seminal works describing what he 
calls the tragedy of the commons. The basic reasoning is that in 
primordial societies, inhabitants of a region shared and jointly used 
commons. Rural ponds for fishing, hunting grounds as well as land 
for living or breeding animals. The main problem in this scenario is 
that, with a growing population, the danger and systematic threat 
of free-rider problems arises. This, in short, is what Hardin refers to 
as the tragedy. Modern economic theory suggests property rights 
to solve the problem. Private ownership can guarantee that the 
owner makes sure a common good is used only to an extent to 
which its sustainability is not endangered, which then is in the own 
private interest of its owner.4 This, however, has led to a number 
of new problems, for instance speculation and asset price inflation. 
The founder of contemporary equilibrium theory has therefore 
suggested letting commons not be owned by private individuals 
but by a public institutions and be granted for private use 
temporarily with usage rights, in the particular case of land 
suggesting long leases (Walras 1896/1990). Measures like these 
have been successfully implemented in many regions and cities, for 
instance in London and New York.5 Reforming fossil fuels 
administration and designing the management of the atmosphere 
in a more incentive-based way will be more efficient, less harmful 
for the environment and could free up funds to finance universal 
access to water and other basic goods (Presse 2015; Jakob et al., 
2015). Applied to the case and natural resource under discussion in 
this paper, namely the atmosphere and its capacity to absorb 
carbon dioxide emissions, private ownership is currently not 
discussed. In light of the challenges private ownership has caused 
in the allocation of other resources, it is therefore suggested to 
apply a policy of public ownership combined with granting private 
usage rights. In some analogy to Walras´ suggestion from 1986, 
published in a new edition in 1990, for long leases, i.e. for timely 
limited usage rights that have to be renegotiated after a certain 
amount of time, it is proposed to grant usage rights, in this case 
emission rights, on an annual basis. This also corresponds to the 
perceived need for timely action in order to meet the agreed 
climate change prevention goals. Annual renegotiation, as we will 
see in the form of annual auctions, also grant policy makers the 
opportunity to adapt and adjust. This may be appropriate as 
changes occur such as new insights about climate change, which 
may make it apparent that even more timely action is required 
(Schelnhuber, 2015) or, potentially, that climate change prevention 
goals can be met at reduced speed without harming the planet’s 
atmosphere.  
Oliver (1991) presents ten institutional factors influencing the 
strategies of actors to react to policy measures like the one 
developed in this paper. These strategies range from acquiescence 
and compromise over avoidance to defiance and manipulation. 
These strategies are not positive or negative per se with respect to 
a desired outcome. The policy model suggested here 
accommodates for all kinds of strategies. While acquiescence and 
compliance are required and even enforced on an operational 
level, actors have the possibility to actively influence and 
manipulate on overarching policy levels. For instance, corporations 
can build their own sinks to receive the permission to sell emission 
passed on along the value chain and finally carried by the consumer (please 
see below for a further elaboration of this effect). 
4 Semantically, the word ‘private’ stems from the Latin word ‘privare’ which 
means ‘stealing’ or ‘depriving’. In the case of commons, depriving others of 
their original right to use a common can be reimbursed. 
5 A considerable amount of New York ground is owned by the New York Port 
Authority, a public body, managing their properties in a market-based way in 
the public interest. The City of Westminster, just west of the City of London, 
is owned by the Earl of Westminster, and is also administrated in a market-
conform way. 
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rights into the market, or they can lobby to influence the total 
volume of emission rights being auctioned and traded afterwards. 
Ansari et al. (2013) arrive at the conclusion that for the emergence 
of an institutional perspective and a commons logic in a 
transnational field, three conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the key 
actors view their fates as being interconnected, (2) these actors 
perceive their own behavior as contributing to the problem and (3) 
they take collective action to address the problem. The global 
climate change prevention policy set forth in this paper provides a 
conceptual framework for condition (3). While relying on 
conditions (1) and (2), the model allows to take concrete measures 
on a supranational level. The research question addressed in this 
paper therefore is: how are private corporations affected by the 
proposed cap, auction and dividend scheme? 
Model Development 
The model developed in this paper is based on three principles: 
sufficiency, efficiency, and equivalence, each of which is assigned 
to an operational level on which climate change prevention 
measures are to be addressed and implemented. Sufficiency is the 
first and most important principle. For the particular purpose of 
designing a global climate change prevention policy, it translates 
into a concrete measure referred to as ‘cap’, i.e. the effective 
enforcement of upper emission thresholds. The purpose of those 
thresholds is that, once they are met and not exceeded, the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can be halted 
or even reversed and a certain (global average) temperature can 
be maintained.  
Sufficiency: Introducing globally binding immission thresholds 
We assume that globally binding thresholds ought to be the prime 
directive of any climate change preventing policy. The first 
principle, sufficiency, is therefore assigned the highest priority and 
applied to an operational level at which the effective limitation of 
emissions globally (‘cap’) is possible. The international community 
has reached an understanding on this level in Paris in 2015, agreeing 
on upper levels for emissions. The next level, however, is even 
more challenging to obtain: global emissions trading schemes are 
currently extremely dysfunctional. The upper level theoretically 
agreed on has not been and is not enforced. As a result, emission 
prices globally are only a shadow of what they should and would 
be if the two degrees Celsius goal were a globally enforced policy.  
Current emission prices are low because there is no global 
emissions scheme effectively enforced. One main reason for this is 
that there are an almost infinite number of emission sources, in 
private households as well as corporate settings, agglomerating on 
national levels. Arriving at a globally binding regime, following the 
emission reduction paradigm, requires the effective control of a 
vast number of emission points. This paper, building on previous 
works and considerations on this particular aspect (Rahmeyer, 
2004) suggests a paradigm shift, turning the points of reference for 
a global climate change preventing policy upside down: controlling 
for and limiting immissions rather than emissions. 
The reasoning is as follows: for each molecule of carbon we know 
the exact amount of carbon dioxide that is emitted when it is 
burned. For 1 g of carbon, 3,67 g of carbon dioxide are set free. 
Combusting one kg of coal sets free about 3,7 kg of carbon dioxide, 
one kg of natural gas about 2,7 kg (as it contains hydrogen as well). 
The values for oil are in-between, depending on the specific 
properties (Eisenbeiß, 2007). These are the amounts set free when 
                                           
6 Not all fossil fuels are directly consumed in combustion engines. Some 
volumes are used for producing many kinds of products, from tires to 
cosmetics. Compared to the combusted amounts, however, those amounts 
(1) appear negligible, (2) some of these will be also burned at the end of their 
life cycle, for instance not-recycled tires, (3) asking to purchase emission 
rights for those volumes does not substantially increase the prices of end 
products, as these are mainly caused by the manufacturing process (take, for 
instance, cosmetics again) and (4) since also this policy, despite all efforts, 
might incur some spill-overs, so not every “drop” of combusted fossil fuels 
those substances are used as fossil fuels and burned, which 
represents approximately 90 % of their use. In other words: rather 
than trying to control the countless points of emissions, we should 
control the relatively small number of immission channels applying 
an upstream approach: “Whoever sells a ton of oil or coal into the 
economic cycle is only allowed to do so when proven that a 
corresponding amount of emission rights have been purchased”. 
One disadvantage of this approach is that companies extracting 
fossil fuels will not be held accountable for the quantities of fossil 
fuels they use themselves. For the problem exists currently no 
entirely satisfying answer. One part of the answer can be that the 
amounts they use compared to the amounts they sell is much 
smaller. Another part of the solution can be that those companies 
will be under scrutiny for their emissions. For this, the international 
control body could install independent verification of how much 
fossil fuels these companies are using for their operations. A third 
option is that already the extraction of fossil fuels is only permitted 
if the extracting companies prove they have purchased the 
equivalent emission rights. Compliance of metering – i. e. do they 
meter and report all they extract – seems to be a key issue to be 
addressed if this third option is being implemented. 
Before moving on to the next element of the model, some more 
explanation about the idea of immission instead of emissions 
control follows. To avoid misunderstanding: the model suggested 
here builds on the status quo, which is ‘cap and trade’. In addition, 
this scheme suggests not simply trade but first auction-off 
emission rights globally and redistribute the revenues per capita 
(see below). The effective way to enforce the auctioning of only 
the amount that the atmosphere can bear, controlling immissions 
rather than emissions suggested for several reasons (for another 
brief discussion of this point please also refer to the implications 
and discussion section in the end of the paper). One is the 
considerably smaller number of immission points than emission 
points, the other is the upfront or upstream control of the amounts 
emitted by controlling the amounts immitted in the first place. In 
other words: Emission rights are auctioned and traded – but 
compliance is not enforced at emission points but at immission 
points. To be even clearer: For the policy to be effectively enforced, 
those market participants selling fossil fuels introducing them into 
the economic cycle have to purchase the emission rights for the 
amount of emissions that will occur if those fuels are burned.6 As 
mentioned above, for the first sale of a ton of oil into the economic 
cycle the combustion of which will result in the emission of three 
tons of CO2, the vendor will then have to have purchased emission 
certificates for three tons of CO2. The buyer can only buy bona fide 
if he receives the documentation from the seller that the amount 
of emission rights equivalent to his purchased volume has been 
bought.7  
In effect, because of the nature of the underlying commodity, this 
approach then allows overcoming nation-based regulations: 
instead of the never-ending debate on emissions and how to avoid 
emissions, one can embark on a fruitful discussion of the (relatively 
small) number of immission channels and how to control and 
regulate them. 
Efficiency: Applying a transparent global 
auctioning system 
At the heart of the problem we currently find the following 
question: Are national regulations the appropriate systemic locus 
when dealing with a globally volatile atmosphere not knowing 
might be properly monitored and accounted for, it is suggested to 
compensate this partially by including all volumes of fossil fuels introduced 
into the economic cycle.   
7 Emission certificates can be forged. But this is a challenge already today and 
methods for effectively avoiding forgery can be applied. One web-based 
approach is the latest blockchain-technology shortly discussed later in the 
paper.  
ISSN 2519-8564 (рrint), ISSN 2523-451X (online). European Journal of Management Issues. – 2018. – 26 (1-2) 
national boarderlines? One major reason nations find it difficult to 
come to actually binding agreements is that corporate lobby 
groups, in fear of increased costs, force them not to. The solution 
must be found on a different systemic level. Monbiot (2007) draws 
on Hillmann and Fleming suggesting a solution ‘giving’ emission 
rights per capita to each nation, who then redistribute to each 
citizen. The effects of a policy like this can be empirically observed 
in formerly communist countries shortly after their transitions: 
employees, after privatization, received a share in the corporations 
they had worked for, not knowing how much they were worth or 
how they could be traded. The effect was that traders and 
speculators, sometimes paying only a fraction what the shares 
were worth, collected large holdings of a particular company. 
Some corporations went bankrupt; other holdings gave rise to the 
new so-called oligarchs. If we want to avoid such effects in global 
emissions trading, it is not the emission rights but their economic 
value, i. e. the money, that should be redistributed per capita. 
Here the problem arises again that the market value of emission 
rights, with an unenforced policy as it is now, does not reflect its 
actual value. This brings us to the discussion about the appropriate 
systemic locus for a global emissions trading scheme: not single 
nations and mercantile exchanges but a global body, the United 
Nations (UN), who are overseeing the negotiations currently, 
should be in charge of auctioning-off emission rights globally at the 
level of the previously established upper emission limits. 
This way the UN would have a systematic and globally binding 
institutional arrangement at hand, which can be enforced with 
controls on a random basis. Global emission certificate trading can 
be put back on its feet: The basically agreed upper limits for 
emissions (’cap’, as is the aforementioned current state of the art) 
are recalculated as upper limits for immission to be allowed into 
the economic cycle. The trade is still with emission rights, but 
emission rights have to be purchased prior to immitting these 
amounts of coal, oil or gas (or any other fossil fuel) into the 
economic cycle as an input for production.  
This procedure satisfies the second condition or principle 
postulated above: efficiency. The highest readiness to pay for 
these auctioned emission rights will be from corporations for 
which avoiding emissions is most costly. Emission rights as a 
globally scarce recourse will be allocated at the point of its highest, 
most efficient, and economic use. Of course, on the basis of 
emission rights once issued (and each year anew), they can be 
traded at international exchanges. Efficiency is obtained on the 
operational level, auctioning off emission rights globally.  
Equivalence: Redistributing the financial value of 
the atmosphere to its ‘owners’ 
In light of this proposed scheme, another question arises, which 
brings us to the dividend aspect of ‘cap, auction and dividend’: Who 
should be the benefiter of the proceeds obtained in the auction 
process? The answer is produced first, and then a discussion of its 
justification ensues. The answer is: The money should be 
redistributed per-capita to individuals globally. There is a three-fold 
reasoning behind this part of the model: (1) an economic reason, 
(2) a political reason and (3) a nature inspired reason. Each of those 
reasons differ in terms of their conceptual and normative 
contribution, reason three undoubtedly being the most normative. 
The three reasons combined establish the implementation of the 
third principle mentioned above: equivalence (Presse, 2010; Presse 
et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2013). It is established by way of granting 
every individual the payout equivalent to the value of her or his 
                                           
8 This is currently the other way round. If one wishes to ‘neutralize’ the 
environmental damage incurred flying or taking a train, one can opt to pay 
more to the carrier who is then promising to purchase an equivalent amount 
of emission rights.  
“share” of the atmosphere as a common good, constituting a basic 
income to all individuals globally. 
The most obvious reason for the per-capita redistribution is an 
economic one (1): As is the case for all climate change preventing 
policies, higher costs are incurred in the production process. 
Corporations must pass these increased costs on to their 
customers and try to avoid those costs by employing more 
environmentally friendly production technologies and input 
resources. This is precisely the desired economic incentive-effect 
that needs to be reached in order to bring about an actual change 
in the way production is taking place. But also the change of 
production technology towards a more environmentally-friendly 
one is costly, and it takes time until it pays off. This proposed 
regime leads to environmentally friendly inputs being cheaper than 
fossil fuels, thus making them economically superior to fossil input 
factors. In any case, corporations have to pass on higher costs 
along the value chain to their customers and, finally the consumer. 
Therefore, the systematic addressee of the proceeds obtained 
from those higher costs, incurred through higher prices that are 
imposed by a global auctioning mechanism enforcing the actual 
emissions price, is the one who pays the higher price in the first 
place: the consumer.  
Since all human beings are consumers (and relatively equal in terms 
of what they need to survive), redistributing the proceeds per 
capita is rather straightforward. For a discussion on the means of 
payment please refer to the implications and discussion section. By 
applying this policy, the individual consumer can determine herself 
to which degree she wishes to consume environmentally friendly 
products. But their decisions from then on are taking place in an 
institutional arrangement that systematically promotes and 
ensures that who consumes environmentally damaging products is 
paying more and who consumes environmentally friendly products 
is paying less (net benefit).8 The model strengthens systematic 
economic superiority of environmentally friendly products and 
makes non-fossil fuels more competitive. Ecological sustainability 
and economic reason are better aligned. Let’s assume the same 
product (quality, functionality, purpose etc.) comes in two 
versions, one more and one less fossil fuel-dependent. Due to 
different production technologies, they today might have the same 
price. By way of this policy, the more fossil-fuel dependent product 
will become more expensive and economically less beneficial to 
use.  
The policy developed in this paper allows to determine the value of 
the carbon dioxide emission absorption capacity of the 
atmosphere once a global cap has been established. This paper is 
not discussing how such a globally binding cap can be established. 
The most likely path, however, is that the international community 
is reaching an agreement, probably involving the UN, and based on 
latest scientific findings what those upper limits can be in order to 
avoid further harm for the atmosphere. In addition, it is suggested 
to redistribute this economic value per capita. The amount paid out 
per capita therefore depends on the auction price of the emission 
rights and the number of emission rights sold. Fig. 1 depicts 
combinations of emission prices and emission volumes.  
At any given demand, the emissions price will be higher the smaller 
the amount of auctioned emission certificates. For example, an 
emissions volume of 50 Gt, once enforced with the upstream policy 
described above, may lead to a price of 20 USD/t or EUR/t. If 50 Gt 
are auctioned at a price of 20 USD/t or EUR/t the total revenue is 1 
trillion (trio) USD or EUR.9 Divided by 7 billion people this yields 
about 143 USD or EUR annually or about 12 USD monthly.10 
9 Prices can also be given in USD. For reasons of simplicity of this base case 
let us assume that USD and EUR are at par, so that 1 EUR equals 1 USD. USD 
and EUR are usually used synonymously in this paper. 
10 The exact figure will depend on the amount of emission rights auctioned 
and the auction price obtained. Based on the history of emission price 
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Decreasing volumes of auctioned emission certificates in this 
example lead to similar auction revenues: after 20 years, in this 
case, emissions reduced to 30 Gt, so an auction price of 40 USD/t 
or EUR/t yields a total revenue of 1.2 trio USD or EUR, thus also 
accommodating a gradual population increase with stable payouts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Combinations of Emission Volumes and Emission Prices; 
reduction path (in Gt) and certificate price (in EUR per ton) 
Despite price fluctuations over time, the total value and the payout 
can be stable. If the global population grows, the value will have to 
be redistributed to a larger number of recipients. A growing world 
population, however, at the same time might result in an increase 
in demand for emissions, as more goods are being demanded and 
produced. Higher demand results in a higher emissions price at a 
given volume auctioned, so the total financial value available for 
redistribution would increase as well, thus leaving the per-capita 
payout stable.  
For a first iteration for calculating the value of the carbon dioxide 
emissions absorption capacity of the atmosphere and the resulting 
payout let us use the following formula, where EV denotes the 
emissions volume (in t) and EP the emissions price (in USD/t or 
EUR/t). GP is the number for the global population. 
𝐸𝑉 ×  𝐸𝑃
𝐺𝑃
= 𝑃𝑝𝐶  
Emission volume times emission price divided by the number of 
population yields the payout per capita (PpC). The poorest of the 
poor live on less than one USD or EUR per capita per day (Sachs 
2005, 174 ff.). An economic policy like the one produced in this 
paper, giving an additional 12 USD or EUR per month into their 
hand, is a substantial increase. 
The second reason for per-capita redistribution is a political one (2): 
Climate negotiations before Paris failed and even after Paris are not 
enforced because economically less developed countries would 
have to reduce their emissions at no obvious benefit, still being a 
result of the 1992 Kyoto-Protocol and the herein engraved 
“grandfathering” arrangements. Emissions as are (or as were) 
were used as a basis for calculating future emission reduction goals 
and paths. In other words: economies like China and India could not 
                                           
development it is assumed that at 50 Gt allowed emissions the price will be 
around 20 USD or EUR per ton (Sijm et al. 2006), leading to a revenue of 1 
trillion USD or EUR from the auctioning process. One trillion USD or EUR 
divided by about 7 billion yields about 143 USD or EUR annually and therefore 
about 12 USD or EUR per capita per month. 50 Gt annually are far beyond 
what this planet can sustainably take. It is an entry starting at current 
emission levels that can then be reduced gradually, for instance one Gt 
and cannot agree to binding arrangements that force them to 
reduce emissions, while two thirds of their inhabitants are still 
living in poverty. The scheme proposed in this paper overcomes 
this problem: developing economics can agree to binding 
arrangements because they know that through a per-capita 
redistribution they will be, by way of their large populations, 
economic benefiters of the model. 
The third reason discussed for the per-capita redistribution is 
nature-inspired (3) and, as mentioned before, perhaps the most 
normative one. It is based on the answer to the question: Who 
owns the planet? Answers on this point may differ widely. Suffice 
to say that the atmosphere is not produced by man but ‘given’ by 
nature. A naturalistic view would therefore argue that it belongs to 
mankind in its entirety. To make it operational and economically 
feasible, private claims to it can be made possible via emission 
rights as developed in this paper. The economic rent of the scarcity 
of the absorption capacity of the atmosphere can, through 
auctioning and redistribution, be given to its ‘owners’ equally. 
Those who use it beyond average, by way of this policy, 
systematically reimburse financially those using it below average. 
Based on this – clearly normative – view one could argue that, as all 
individuals are co-owners, they are entitled to the economic 
proceeds when it is annually auctioned. 
In summary, the global auctioning and redistribution process can 
be described as follows. Like in any other climate change 
protection policy, the international community has to come to a 
consensus, based on scientific findings, how much emissions the 
planet can bear. This amount is then auctioned globally (Step 1, see 
fig.2). 
An international governing body, it is suggested this to be the 
United Nations, establishes within its structures a fund. The 
revenues from globally auctioning emission rights flow into this 
fund. It is understood that prior to this process, the international 
community would have to reach an agreement to let the UN carry 
out this procedure. In step 2, the proceeds from the auctioning 
process are redistributed per capita globally.  
Companies downstream the value chain, for instance 
manufacturers, service companies etc., purchase from the fossil 
fuel extraction companies the fossil fuels they need for their 
operations and production. If in their production process, they 
employ technologies allowing them to emit fewer carbon dioxide 
per ton than would have to be expected in the case of a regular 
combustion, and if this is documented and certified, they may then 
sell the emission volumes not used by them (step 3). Potential 
buyers of these ‘additional’ emission rights are again the oil 
extracting companies, as buying back these emission rights 
enables them to extract more oil. This buying-back process can 
either take place through a direct sale, or within an emissions 
trading scheme like it already exists today. The difference to today 
is that the amount of allowed emissions globally will have been 
effectively enforced via the auctioning process, in which only the 
amount of emissions allowed for this particular year will have been 
auctioned.   
Some examples can help explain how the model works for several 
industries involved. We choose an oil company, a plastic producer 
and a metal smelter as examples. The oil company, in order to be 
allowed to sell the oil, must have purchased the amount of 
emission rights that is equivalent to the amount of emissions set 
free when the oil they sell is combusted. 
  
annually over 30 years to reach 20 Gt (compare fig. 1), a still high but more 
bearable amount that can be reduced further. The precise price reactions are 
to be established by further research in a thorough elasticity analysis taking 
the effects of the proposed policy (technology and therefore demand 
changes) into account.  
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Fig. 2. Global Auction and Global Redistribution 
The oil company will forward the emissions price to its customers 
(mainly business customers who then forward it further along the 
value chain to the consumer). 
A plastic producer, needing oil as one of the main ingredients in the 
production of plastic, buys the oil from the oil company and, by 
doing so, has paid the emission rights the oil company has 
purchased in order to be able to sell the oil to him. A metal smelter, 
needing coal as one of its major ingredients, will purchase this coal 
from a coal mining company. This coal mining company, in analogy 
to the oil company, has to purchase for each ton of coal it sells the 
amount of emission rights for the emissions that are set free if the 
coal is burned, and includes the costs in its sales price. As it is a 
factor price increase, all mining companies face the same situation 
and therefore can include the emissions costs in their prices even 
in competitive situations. So in effect, the metal smelter, when 
buying the coal from the mining company, is paying for the 
emission rights purchased by the mining company and implicitly 
rolled-over to him via an increased sales price for the coal.11 
Implications and Discussion 
ne effect of the policy is that emission reduction goals and 
individual consumption incentives are systematically aligned. 
Emission reduction goals can be reached in a transparent way 
thanks to the relatively limited number of immission points, while 
previous policy suggestions mainly focus on countless emission 
points. It becomes systematically more beneficent financially to 
consume goods and employ technologies causing smaller amounts 
of emissions, and the emission rights for these emissions have been 
                                           
11 This and other examples taken from (Presse, & Paetzold, 2017). 
12 This is under the first and very rough assumption that the proposed 
emissions auctioning and trading scheme with enforced emission thresholds 
leads to a price of 20 USD or EUR per ton of CO2equivalent. Depending on 
the specific density of the fuel and therefore the weight of a barrel, it is 
further assumed that one ton contains the equivalent amount of about 
paid at the inception of the value chain upstream at the point of 
immission. The pragmatic consequences of this can be 
demonstrated using an example Monbiot (2007) makes. He states 
that travelling in general and flying in particular, you “sacrifice […] 
the biosphere and the lives of the poor”. Once the policy 
developed in this paper is successfully implemented, this reads as 
follows: You can travel with a good conscience, as you can be 
certain that the emissions you cause are in line with the global 
upper emissions threshold (immission orientation). Fossil fuels only 
enter the market when the equivalent amount of emission rights 
have been purchased. You can expect to pay around ten per cent 
more for travelling12, while at the same time knowing you receive a 
payment of about 12 USD or EUR per month per-capita dividend. So 
if you do not travel at all, you have a financial net benefit, if you 
travel heavily, you are a financial net contributor and if you travel 
average, your per-capita reimbursement will compensate your 
increased costs. This is the kind of incentive structure we assume a 
necessity for an effective global climate change prevention policy, 
linking global upper thresholds to individual consumption and 
production behavior in a transparent and self-determined way. 
Some related questions require considerable attention and further 
research. Some initial answers shall be given for starting the 
discussion: 
How does the proposed scheme make handling emissions and 
emission rights easier? 
A firm’s management has to take into account the implications of 
two elements that affects its interaction with emissions and 
emission rights. One are the emissions itself, which companies 
seven barrels of crude oil. Then assuming that for each ton of oil three tons 
of emissions are incurred, the price for one ton or seven barrels of oil 
increases by 60 EUR, therefore increasing the price per barrel by about 9 USD 
or EUR. Also take into account that not all costs of travelling are fossil fuel 
costs. 
Step 1:  
auctioning emission  
rights globallyvolues 
Step 2:  
redistributing  
the revenues per capita volues 
Global Population
United Nations 
Fossil fuel extracting companies Downstream companies that acquire  
fossil fuels for productive activities 
Step 3:  
Companies sell unused emission rights 
back to the extracting companies 
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today seek to reduce employing technology helping them to 
reduce emissions. The other is the process of purchasing emission 
rights. The proposed scheme represents a considerable shift and 
simplification of the processes involved in dealing with those two.  
First, avoiding the emission itself remains the prime directive for 
companies seeking to realize an environmentally friendly and 
sustainable production. Today, however, corporations are 
concerned with reducing emissions, which cannot actually be 
reduced for any given amount of fossil fuels they employ in their 
production process. Emissions can be contained and stored 
elsewhere rather than emitting it, but it remains a given chemical 
fact, a natural law if you want, that for each ton of oil or coal or gas 
burned a certain amount of carbon is remaining, either in the air or 
in other storages. So, today, corporations are bound to purchase 
emission rights (or receive them granted from governments), as 
shown in fig. 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selling oil/fossil fuel-containing products to 
 
 
Fig. 3. Carbon Certificate Management Process before Immissions-Cap-Auction-Dividend Scheme 
With the immissions management scheme proposed in this paper, 
this focus changes.  The primary concern for the general economy 
and governments remains how to reduce emissions. The means of 
management however – the operational level if you want – shifts 
from emissions to immissions. Corporations no longer have to 
purchase emissions certificate from goverments or exchanges and 
modify the way they dispose of carbon (trying to reduce air 
pollution by simply storing it elsewhere) but can focus of avoiding 
the creation of carbon in the first place. I. e., they will focus on 
shifting their production towards technology that avoids 
producing carbon itself. No longer will they purchase emission 
rights, but by purchasing fossil fuels from fossil fuel extracting 
companies have implicitly purchase for the introduction of the 
fossil fuel into the economic cycle (fig. 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selling oil/fossil fuel-containing products to 
 
Fig. 4. Carbon Certificate Management Process with Immissions-Cap-Auction-Dividend Scheme 
 
Carbon Certificate Management with the Immissions-Cap-Auction-
Dividend Scheme Corporations will have paid the price for 
emissions because the extracting companies have to purchase 
emission rights (and forward the costs for that to their customers) 
in order to be allowed to introduce (immit) carbon or the the fossil 
fuel carring it into the economic cycle. So by the time it leaves the 
chimneys and exhaust pipes, the equivalent amount of emission 
rights has already been paid before or when the carbon entered 
the economic cycle. This approach can also be referred to as an 
upstream management approach.  
                                           
13 Population growth is likely to be reduced by the model, ensuring that even 
the poorest of the poor have this payout as a retirement plan and therefore 
do not ‘have to produce’ many children in order to, at a given infant 
How can an amount of 12 USD or EUR per month 
be redistributed per capita to 7 billion13 
individuals?  
The answer for many of those individuals, the wealthiest and the 
poorest, is surprisingly simple. In developed economies, almost 
every individual has a bank account today and for the EU, a bank 
account is discussed to be mandatory (European Union, 2013). Each 
individual has a tax number linked to that bank account, where tax 
payments or reimbursements are typically handled. So the 
mortality, ensure there are at least one or two children taking care of them 
when they are old. 
Corporation 1 
Purchasing 
Emission Rights 
from  
Oil Extracting 
Company Corporation 2 Corporation 3 Consumers 
Governments/Certificate Traders 
Purchasing 
Emission Rights 
from  
Purchasing 
Emission Rights 
from  
Governments/Certificate Traders 
Corporation 1 
Oil Extracting 
Company Corporation 2 Corporation 3 Consumers 
Purchasing 
Emission 
Rights from  
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infrastructure is in place in developed (and most of the developing) 
countries. Also in India, every citizen is intended to receive her or 
his individual identification number (Nilekani, 2009). Micro-credits 
have shown that is possible to procure basic banking services even 
to the poorest of the poor. In other words: If a person is entitled to 
12 USD or EUR monthly bank charges of micro credit or online 
banks. We leave this discussion at this point to the financial 
technology industry and to future research evaluating and 
implementing the options and establishing the modularities for the 
payments.  
For those who neither live in developed countries nor in countries 
with sufficient banking services for the poorest of the poor, the 
money can be given to national governments in the meantime, 
similar to the suggestions by Monbiot (2007), but with the clear 
charter to establish those banking services. Then, however, the 
question needs to be answered what we should do in countries 
with governments known to be corrupt. For this fourth case, we 
could potentially turn to blockchains again, this time via ‘colored 
coins’ that can only be used for the purchase of food. Colored coins 
are a form of digital money that is coded in such a way that it can 
only be used for specific applications, similar in concept to a loyalty 
rewards scheme from a specific store14. Alternatively the money 
can be provided to the UN World Food Program that makes sure 
that also in those countries those in need have access to food and 
at the same time can exert pressure on these countries to 
implement rendering the banking services mentioned. The very 
favorable side effect for the United Nations is that, in food crises 
as they occasionally appear, they need not further – or at least less 
so – draw on member states ‘begging’ for money to help the poor. 
The UN then has means of their own to supply the services and 
food support to those most in need.  
How can reluctant nations be made to join the 
policy? 
This question appears reasonable and understandable. However, it 
still roots in the paradigm that this book paper seeks to overcome: 
thinking in national borders. It is acknowledged that most policy 
decisions were and still are today made on national levels (Murdoch 
& Sandler, 1997). This undisputable fact is more part of the problem 
than it is a part of the solution for the global climate challenge. Of 
course it must be taken into account when building a globally 
practicable solution path. The most practicable pathway for its 
implementation is that leading nations, e. g. the G7 or the G20, which 
account for roughly 80% of global wealth, income and emissions, 
agree on this globally binding policy. It is an element of leadership 
that is required in the leading figures and heads of state. If a policy is 
acknowledged, first in theory and then by policy makers, as a 
technically and economically feasible pathway, future ecological, 
economical, and social challenges will increasingly call for its 
implementation. It is desirable not to limit the knowledge and 
support for the policy to scientists and policy makers but to extend it 
to a wider audience ultimately influencing or at least inspiring policy 
makers. This is one reason for publishing the policy in this book.  
Can the Policy be applied to other Greenhouse 
Gases as well? 
Yes. Other greenhouse gases such as methane and Freon (used in 
air conditions) contribute to climate change as well and in smaller 
quantities. The policy described in this paper can be applied to 
those gases, too. 
                                           
14 I thank the editors for introducing this possibility 
How does the Policy influence or consider 
Population Growth? 
The effect of population growth on accordingly increasing emission 
prices and hence a stable income per capita has already been 
discussed above. However, some readers may fear an increase in the 
world population that would exceed the adaptive capacity of such a 
system once even the poorest of the poor receive a monthly 
payment helping them to survive. One aspect of population growth 
in particular in developing countries is that couples see the number 
of their children as an increased security for their retirement. In other 
words: at a relatively high child mortality rate, a higher number of 
children makes it more likely that enough of them grow up to then 
support their elders. How will a policy change this, which makes sure 
even the poorest of the poor can count on a monthly payment 
helping them to survive? It can be assumed that with increased 
income stability, people are less worried about retirement. On the 
other hand, with every child born a family receives 10-12 USD or EUR 
per month, so potentially birth rates could also rise. Further 
questions like the credibility of this policy arrive at this point. These 
questions are not policy-specific, but of course they have to be 
addressed in an orderly and convincing way, providing one avenue 
for further research on this topic.  
Immissions- or emissions trading? 
This paper elaborated on the proposition to focus on immissions 
rather than emissions on the policy level. Given the current state of 
discussion and the way market participants are accustomed to 
think about emission rights, rather than immission rights, it 
appears more feasible to auction and trade emission rights. This 
approach makes it also easier for downstream market-participants 
to purchase additional emission rights if they engage in activities 
involving higher volumes of carbon dioxide. It also allows provides 
of additional sinks to issue emission rights. Finally, it does not affect 
the immissions-based upstream input-regime developed above to 
trade with emission rights. Therefore it is suggested to stick with 
the terminology and concept accustomed to current market 
participants and policy makers. 
Conclusions 
he proposed economic policy model is different from other 
currently discussed proposals in four ways:  
1. It suggests to focus global climate change policy on 
immissions, applying an upstream approach targeting the 
limited number of input channels at which the source-material 
of later carbon dioxide emissions is first introduced into the 
global industrial complex, rather than controlling for emissions 
at countless emission points. 
2. It suggests a global auctioning of the previously established and 
allowed emission volumes. Rather than giving it to nation 
states who then can use them more or less as they please, 
global auctioning centralizes the process for establishing a 
globally unified price for emission rights, and hereby the 
market value of the resource. 
3. The model promotes a global per-capita redistribution: a Climate 
Change Prevention Dividend. This ensures that each individual 
receives the economic value of their ‘share’ of the 
atmospheres’ absorption capacity. The resulting income of an 
estimated USD 12 per month would have a tremendous impact 
in particular on the “bottom of the pyramid” population of 
about 1 billion individuals that live on USD 2 or less per day, and 
that are both most vulnerable and least culpable for climate 
change. Hence, effective climate protection measures would 
be combined with systemic and democratic development 
support for the poor; a key deliverable for the UN. The 
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implications of 2 and 3 lead to an increased relevance of the 
following point: 
4. Not single nations are disposing of the use of the resource and 
its economic value but a global organization like the UN. This is 
appropriate for the handling of a resource which itself does 
not ‘know’ any national borders. Therefore, the current 
climate challenges train us to overcome thinking in national 
borders, a goal supported and systematically ensured by the 
proposed global policy model. 
With the model developed in this paper, production and 
consumption choices are drawn towards a more sustainable 
equilibrium. This equilibrium includes ecologic-, entrepreneurial-
economic- and social sustainability. Technologies like blockchain, 
systematically connecting economic and environmental links of the 
global value chain, potentially provide the operational base and 
working tool to implement the solutions in a practicable way. 
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